China’s approach to sovereign lending and debt restructuring

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6 October 2021
CABRI workshop
Roadmap

• Patterns of lending and key institutions
• China’s approach to debt restructuring
• Current developments and opportunities in debt restructuring
Patterns of lending and key institutions
Chinese lending in Africa

• 152bn USD from 2000-2018, peaking around 2013-5 and showing signs of decline
  • Top recipients: Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia, Kenya

• Announcements during Forum of China African Cooperation (FOCAC), last held in 2018
  • Africa tied to Belt and Road Initiative

Sectoral distribution of Chinese loans to Africa, 2000-2019
Terms and conditions of Chinese loans

• China as a new creditor: more commercial, more secretive compared to other OECD lenders.
  • Concerns over special clauses around collateral, ‘no-Paris Club’ and confidentiality clauses

• Limited debt forgiveness
  • Most ‘loan forgiveness’ has been of zero-interest loans (ZILs), which are 5% of overall lending portfolio

• Debt negotiations and decision-making structures will vary by the type of loan and the creditor involved.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Lending institution</th>
<th>Lending instrument</th>
<th>Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid loans</td>
<td>CIDCA/ MOFCOM</td>
<td>Zero-interest loans (ZILs)</td>
<td>RMB-denominated, typically 0% interest rate, 20-year maturity and 10-year grace period</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eximbank</td>
<td>Concessional Loans (CL)</td>
<td>RMB-denominated, typical interest rate of 2-3%, 15-20-year maturity and 5-year grace period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-foreign aid official loans</td>
<td>Eximbank</td>
<td>Export Buyer’s Credits (EBCs); Preferential Export Buyer’s Credits (PEBC)</td>
<td>USD-denominated, loan terms vary. PEBCS have a slightly subsidised interest rate, maturity typically 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial loans</td>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Middle-and long-term project loans</td>
<td>USD or EUR- denominated, floating rate set to LIBOR at typical rate of 4.5-6%, varying maturity and grace periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICBC, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
China’s approach to debt restructuring
Zero-interest loans (ZILs)

MFA
Embassies
ECCOs

MOFCOM
CIDCA

MOF

Eximbank

CDB
ICBC/BOC

Sinosure

Zero-Interest Loans
Concessional Loans
(Pref.) Export Buyers’ Credits
Project Loans

approves
budget control
Policy Bank Loans

- MOF
- MOFCOM
- MFA
- CIDCA
- ICBC/BOC
- Eximbank
- CDB
- Sinosure

- Zero-Interest Loans
- Concessional Loans
- (Pref.) Export Buyers’ Credits
- Project Loans

Approves: MOF, MOFCOM, MFA, CIDCA
Budget control: MOFCOM, MOF, MFA, CIDCA
Commercial loans

MOFCOM
CIDCA
Zero-Interest Loans

MOF

Eximbank
Concessional Loans
(Pref. Buyers' Credits)

CDB
Project Loans

ICBC/BOC
Project Loans

Sinosure

Reports to State Council

Insures
Lenders are conservative

- The more commercial in nature the loan, the more narrow the scope of possibilities for debt relief

- Political economy factors:
  - Personal Liability – *will the decision-maker be personally accountable?*
  - Past Precedent – *is there a past example of this occurring?*

- → can lead to a prolonged negotiation process
Political Pressures matter

• Debt relief for commercial loans is easier with top-down pressure
  • High-level strategic relationship in critical in borrowers’ ability to change the terms of their Chinese loans

• International pressures – IMF and involvement of other actors also generate pressures on China to respond.

• Negotiation capacity and transparency of borrowers
Current debt relief initiatives
China’s participation in COVID-19 debt relief

• White Paper (2021) maintains an insistence on bilateral debt negotiations, while supporting multilateral initiatives
  • 13 countries in ongoing negotiations.

• First time participating in a multilateral debt initiative
  • → G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI)
  • → Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond the DSSI
DSSI and Common Framework

- G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) – limited by lack of private sector participation
  - Only China Eximbank participated as an ‘official’ creditor, other banks encouraged on “voluntary” basis
  - Debt suspension in line with practice of Chinese banks

- Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond the DSSI (CF)
  - Comparability of debt treatment
  - Ministry of Finance driving collaboration, working with IMF
Prospects for Common Framework and other debt initiatives

• Chinese lenders constructively participating in CF
  • Questions around private sector participation and CDB

• Uptake of initiative is low, and lack of clarity around procedures and negotiations

• New Proposals: linking debt and climate
  • debt-for-nature/debt-for-climate swaps
  • Brady-type bonds and commodity linked bonds
Conclusions
Take aways

• China’s lending system is fragmented and different banks face different incentive structures

• Outcomes and possibilities for debt relief vary – but there are structural and political constraints to debt relief

• Political signals matter, as does a good bilateral relationship

• China is committed and collaborative with the G20 DSSI and CF, but they still face many challenges
Recommendations

1. Understand the terms and details of loan in terms of their lending institution and the horizon of debt restructuring possibilities.

2. Maintain bilateral relationships and credibility. Chinese lenders may be more flexible, but timely notification and coordination is important – esp. regarding actors like Sinosure.

3. Strengthen domestic frameworks around debt transparency – greater information sharing can be advantage to bargaining power.

4. Carefully evaluate new debt relief instruments (CF, brady bonds, debt swap) and consider potential opportunities to align debt and other agendas.
Thank you

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