

The Bumbuna Hydro-electric Project

A case study on private sector involvement through bilateral loans

Session 7
CABRI 6th Annual Seminar
Mauritius

18 and 19 May 2010

• • Background

- Construction of a dam on the Seli River, a 50 Megawatt power station and transmission line
- 40 year history
- Context of power shortage
 - In 2005 only 11 megawatt capacity
 - Only 5% of population with access to electricity
 - High cost

• • Project initiation

- Early 1970s a Swiss firm developed at 15 year electricity supply plan, which identified Bumbuna area for dam and station
- In 1972/3 Italian firm Salcost subcontracted feasibility study to 2nd
 Italian firm
- Reviewed in 1974 by third Italian firm (Studio Pietrangeli, SP) who advised another feasibility study after hydrology study
 - Accepted in 1980 by GoSL + WB
- SP then prepared tender documentation (1981/2-1983)
- But in 1981, Salcost negotiated single-source contract deal with GoSL, funded through loan (USD 20 million) underwritten by Italian government
 - Construction camp and preliminary works
 - Contract signed pre-loan
 - Other donors withdrew
- 1983 WB asked for scaled down plans from SP.
 - 2nd dam removed
 - Inspection chamber removed (consequences in 2009)
- In 1985 WB withdrew

Project continuation up toCivil War

- But Gol continued funding
 - 1988 next contracts with Salcost
 - In 1989 USD112 million loan agreed
- In 1991 AfDB signed agreement with GoSL
 - Allowed work to continue to 1992
- In 1993 further contracts signed (not started)
- But in same year funding dried up and 1988 contracts were suspended
 - After debt write off by GoI (USD100 million turned into grants of USD132 million)
- In 1993 AfDB provided funding which allowed 1988 contracts to continue and one 1993 contract to start
- Up to 1997, when construction work was 85% complete
- Then civil war standstill to 2002

• • Post Civil War

- Project re-financing agreement Salcost inspected site
 - Work could continue
 - But transmission lines subsequently damaged 2004 to 2007 – repaired by 2009 (OPEC funded)
- In 2005 contract addendum for 1988 and 1993 contracts
- In 2007 work suspended due to lack of financing
 - Salcost said gov owed USD38 million plus USD6 million interest from 1990s
 - Never audited
 - Private bank / World Bank risk guarantee deal fell through
 - But newly elected gov secured funding and in 2008 reservoir was allowed to fill for first time 30+ years after first studies
 - First electricity generated in 2009

• • • But...

- Salcost did not give up claim to debt
- Negotiated deal with energy ministry to own 51% of new Bumbuna Dam Company
 - Rights to cashflow for 20-25 years
 - Deal went through Cabinet but halted in Parliament
- In Nov 2009 responsibility and risk passed from Salcost to Bumbuna Hydro Power Agency (BHPA)
 - No guarantees on project
- Who will run project?
 - Salcost likely to be contracted

Forward work and management

- Gol pledged USD25 million for next phase preparatory work
 - Construction of 2nd dam
 - Gol argues it will not prejudice results of international tender
- Infrastructure cannot handle load
 - Only half capacity
 - Further loans to upgrade infrastructure

• • Project Budget

Year	Italian Govt	ADB		GoSL	DFID	OPEC	Total*	%
		Loan	Grant				\$US mill.	
1982	20.0						20.0	7%
1989	112.0**						112.0	38%
1990		41.7	3.3				45.0	15%
1995		23.5					23.5	8%
2004	23.4						23.4	8%
2006						10.0	10.0	3%
2008	15.6	11.2		6.5	9.1		42.4	14%
Various				21.7			21.7	7%
Total	171.0	76.4	3.3	28.2	9.1	10.0	298.0	100%
%	57%	26%	1%	9%	3%	3%	100%	
Source: Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project PIU (NPA), GoSL additional financing figure obtained from AfDB								

• • Questions

- What risk was faced by project in early 1980s and how could it have been avoided?
- What risk is faced now and how can it be mitigated?
- What other experience of risk in bilaterally financed projects and tender processes?